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ABSTRACT
Data-driven techniques are used in cyber-physical systems (CPS) for
controlling autonomous vehicles, handling demand responses for
energy management, and modeling human physiology for medical
devices. ese data-driven techniques extract models from training
data, where their performance is oen analyzed with respect to
random errors in the training data. However, if the training data is
maliciously altered by aackers, the eect of these aacks on the
learning algorithms underpinning data-driven CPS have yet to be
considered. In this paper, we analyze the resilience of classication
algorithms to training data aacks. Specically, a generic metric
is proposed that is tailored to measure resilience of classication
algorithms with respect to worst-case tampering of the training
data. Using the metric, we show that traditional linear classication
algorithms are resilient under restricted conditions. To overcome
these limitations, we propose a linear classication algorithm with
a majority constraint and prove that it is strictly more resilient than
the traditional algorithms. Evaluations on both synthetic data and a
real-world retrospective arrhythmia medical case-study show that
the traditional algorithms are vulnerable to tampered training data,
whereas the proposed algorithm is more resilient (as measured by
worst-case tampering).
CCS CONCEPTS
•Computing methodologies →Supervised learning by clas-
sication; Batch learning; •Computer systems organization
→Embedded and cyber-physical systems; •Security and pri-
vacy →Domain-specic security and privacy architectures;
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1 INTRODUCTION
e penetration of data-driven techniques (e.g., machine learning)
to monitor and control a broad range of cyber-physical systems has
sharply increased. Autonomous cars rely on visual object detectors
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learned from image data for recognizing objects[12, 25, 30]. Build-
ing demand response can be eectively handled by data-driven
modeling and prediction of the electric usage of buildings [33].
Smart insulin pumps can adapt to type 1 diabetic patients using
data-driven modeling of user-specic eating and pump-using be-
havior [13]. While data-driven CPS oer remarkable capabilities
for enhanced performance, they also introduce unprecedented se-
curity vulnerabilities with the risk of malicious aacks having
catastrophic consequences. Specically, the training data used for
learning (be it online or oine), is vulnerable to malicious tam-
pering that can result in data-driven CPS reacting incorrectly to
safety-critical events.
e training data for data-driven CPS can be tampered in several
ways, depending on the application. In modern automobiles, multi-
ple vulnerabilities have been demonstrated where hackers obtain
full control of automobiles by eavesdropping a Controller Area Net-
work (CAN) and injecting CAN messages [11, 29], which provides
possibilities to inject malicious data being used for online learning
algorithms [12, 25]. Furthermore, automobiles and robots, which
rely on sensor inputs from global positioning system (GPS), inertial
measurement unit (IMU) or wheel speed sensors, can be susceptible
on spoong aacks [26, 43, 45]. is means aackers can tamper
training data collected from sensors. Hacking incidents on medi-
cal devices and hospitals [1–3] suggest aackers can tamper both
device-level and data center-level training data. Moreover, aackers
with knowledge of the underlying machine learning techniques –
e.g., support vector machines (SVMs), principal component anal-
ysis, logistic regression, articial neural network, and (ensemble)
decision trees – can strategically alter the training data to minimize
the accuracy of the algorithms [6, 7, 23, 27, 34, 46], to maliciously
aect the performance of data-driven CPS [12, 13, 25, 33, 39, 42, 48].
Capabilities provided by traditional cyber defenses (e.g., com-
munication channel encryption and authentication), fault tolerant
techniques (e.g., data sanitization [16], robust loss functions [51, 53],
and robust learning [14, 20]), and adversarial learning [9, 17, 19]
are necessary to secure data-driven CPS, but they are not sucient.
Specically, the cyber defenses are insucient for defending against
cyber-physical aacks (e.g., GPS spoong [26]) where a sensing
environment can be maliciously altered such that correctly function-
ing sensors and systems can act erroneously. ese challenges are
compounded in dynamic applications (e.g., autonomous driving and
closed-loop physiological control) where accurate physical models,
commonly required for fault tolerant systems, are challenging to
obtain. Moreover, adversarial learning literature (e.g., [9, 17, 19])
usually assumes a known aacker behavior and/or goal – which
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is likely unknown in complex CPS applications. Due to the short-
comings of traditional approaches for securing the training data of
data-driven CPS, it is necessary to consider techniques for resilient
machine learning that can defend against cyber-physical aacks
and make minimal assumptions on environments and aackers.
Towards the ultimate goal of aack-resilient machine learning,
we propose a resilience metric for the analysis and design of learn-
ing algorithms under cyber-physical aacks. e metric aims to
quantify the resilience of learning algorithms for analysis, which in
turn contributes to designing resilient learning algorithms. Speci-
cally, this work considers binary linear classication algorithms in
the presence of maliciously tampered training data. Binary linear
classication represents a basic building block for more complex
classication approaches, such as neural network, decision trees,
and boosting; thus, developing aack resilient linear classiers can
lead to more advance resilient machine learning algorithms. To
analyze binary classiers in the presence of training data aacks,
we introduce a generic measure of resilience for classication in
terms of worst-case errors.
Based on the resilience metric, traditional linear classication
algorithms are evaluated. First, we prove the maximal resilience of
any linear classication algorithm, which provides an upper bound
of a resilience condition that can be achievable. en, we prove
that convex loss linear classication algorithms, such as SVMs, and
0-1 loss linear classication algorithm can not achieve maximal
resilience. Based on these results, we introduce a majority 0-1 loss
linear classication algorithm that is strictly more resilient than
the traditional approaches and achieves the maximal resilience
condition.
Finally, we evaluate the dierent classication algorithms, in the
presence of aacks, on a synthetic dataset and a medical case-study,
introduced in [24], to design a detector for arrhythmia (i.e., irregular
heart beat). e evaluation on synthetic data illustrates conditions
when the dierent algorithms are (and are not) resilient, while the
arrhythmia dataset serves to illustrate resilient binary classication
in a real-world data-driven medical CPS (described in Section 7).
In summary, the contributions of this work include: (i) intro-
ducing, to our knowledge, the rst assessment metric for analyz-
ing binary classier resilience; (ii) providing an analysis of the
resilience of traditional binary classication techniques illustrat-
ing their shortcomings; (iii) describing a resilient classication
approach that provides maximal resilience; (iv) evaluating in a
retrospective real-world arrhythmia classication case-study.
e following section describes the work most closely related to
the resilient classication problem considered herein. In Section 3,
we dene aacker capabilities and a resilience metric. In Section 4,
the resilient classication problem is formally dened while an
analysis of traditional linear classication algorithms is provided in
Section 5. In Section 6, a new resilient linear classication algorithm
is proposed which achieves maximal resilience for the aacker’s
capabilities considered. Section 7 illustrates the theoretical results
using case studies on synthetic and medical data. e nal section
provides conclusions with discussion about countermeasures and
future work.
2 RELATEDWORK
is section presents the related works for CPS security (Section 2.1)
and traditional error/aack models in the machine learning litera-
ture (Section 2.2).
2.1 CPS security
ough the security of learning systems for data-driven CPS has
been an aerthought, the security of CPS has seen much eort in
the past decade. A mathematical framework considering aacks on
CPS is proposed in [10, 41]. e necessary and sucient conditions
on CPS with a failure detector such that a stealthy aacker can
destabilize the system are provided in [35]. State estimation for
an electric power system is analyzed in [47] assuming aackers
know a partial model of the true system. Resilient state estimators
for CPS that tolerate a bounded number of sensors and/or actu-
ators aacks are considered in [18, 38]. In mobility-as-a-Service
systems (e.g., ride-sharing services), it has been demonstrated that
a fraction of cars are maliciously called by fake reservation for
denial-of-service [52]. Surgical tele-operated robotic systems can
be aected by denial-of-service aacks on communication channels
[8]. Energy management systems, especially when connected to
building networks, are vulnerable to cyber aacks that impact on
the systems operation. is vulnerability can be aenuated by ap-
plying resilient policy when aacks are detected [39]. While there
has been much recent work on CPS security, these approaches are
(in general) not directly applicable to data-driven CPS.
2.2 Learning with Errors
In this subsection, we review the literature on learning in the pres-
ence of training data errors most closely related to our work, where
a more complete survey of the entire literature can be found in
[22, 36]. e error models can be categorized as either label errors
or feature errors in Table 1, according to their classical denitions
[22, 36]. Under each error model, the performance of a learning al-
gorithm is analyzed against whether it achieves a desired classier.
label errors class-independent (CICE) [4]class-dependent (CDCE) [36]
feature errors
uniform random (URAE) [44]
product random (PRAE) [22]
malicious errors (ME) [28]
Table 1: Taxonomy of training data errors in the literature.
When labels in training data are corrupted, the training data
is said to have label errors, which can be divided into two sub-
types: class-independent classication errors (CICE) [4] and class-
dependent classication errors (CDCE) [36]. e class-independent
classication error model assumes the error probability of positive
and negative labels are same while the class-dependent classica-
tion error model allows the dierent error probability for positive
and negative labels.
When features in the training data are corrupted, the training
data is said to have feature errors, which can be divided into three
subtypes: uniform random aribute errors [44], product random
aribute errors [22], and malicious errors [28]. Both the uniform
random aribute error (URAE) and the product random aribute
error (PRAE) models assume errors on features (i.e., columns of the
feature matrix), where URAE assumes the same error probability for
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all features and PRAE allows for variable error probabilities. From
a CPS perspective, aacks on individual features require that each
column of the feature matrix corresponds to a single aack surface
(e.g., a single sensor) – which restricts the use of multiple sensors in
a single feature, as common in data-driven CPS [12, 25]. Dierent
from URAE and PRAE, the malicious error (ME) model assumes
arbitrary aacks on feature vectors (i.e., rows of the feature matrix).
However, the ME model assumes the probabilities of aacking
the feature vectors corresponding to positive and negative labels
are the same – a condition which may not be satised by savvy
aackers. In contrast to this, our error (or aack) model assumes
the probabilities can be dierent.
3 SETUP FOR RESILIENT BINARY
CLASSIFICATION
is section introduces essential denitions that are the bases for
describing resilient binary classication problem. In the following
subsections, we present a traditional binary linear classication
problem (Section 3.1), dene our aacker assumptions (Section 3.2),
and introduce a resilience metric (Section 3.3).
Notationally, we write R, R+0 , N0 and [a,b] to denote the set
of real numbers, non-negative real numbers, non-negative inte-
gers, and integers from a to b, respectively. We write 1 as the
ones vector of an appropriate size and | · | to denote the cardi-
nality (i.e., number of elements) of a nite set. e sign func-
tion is wrien as sign : R → {+1,−1} and 1{·} corresponds to
the indicator function that maps true and false to 1 and 0. Ad-
ditionally, we write `01 to denote a 0-1 loss function, such that
`01 (yi ,h(xi )) = 1
{
yi , sign(h(xi ))
}. Lastly, ‖ · ‖1 and ‖ · ‖∞ de-
notes the 1-norm and the∞-norm, respectively. See Table 2 for the
glossary of mathematical notations in this paper.
3.1 Traditional Binary Classication
We begin by considering the traditional problem of binary classi-
cation in the absence of aacks (or errors). Namely, we consider
un-aacked training data Dˆ = {(xi ,yi )}Ni=1 ∈ Dˆ, where N is the
number of training data pairs, Dˆ = {D ⊂ X × Y | |D | = N } is a
class of training data with N pairs, X ⊆ Rp corresponds to a set
of feature vectors (or aributes), Y = {−1,+1} denotes the set of
labels (or classes), and each element of xi is called a feature. In a tra-
ditional (binary) classication problem, such as [50], given training
data, a designer species a set of (real-valued) classiersH ⊆ RX ,
and a loss function ` : Y×R→ R+0 , to learn a (real-valued) classier
hˆ ∈ H , according to
PH , ` (Dˆ) : hˆ = arg min
h∈H
‖W · Rˆ` (h |Dˆ)‖1, (1)
where W ∈ R2×2 is the diagonal matrix with the positive risk
weightw+ and the negative risk weightw− on the diagonal, and ze-
ros elsewhere. Rˆ` (h |Dˆ) ∈ R2 denotes the bi-dimensional vector of
empirical risks corresponding to the positive and negative training
data. Specically, we write Rˆ` (h |Dˆ) =
[
Rˆ` (h |Dˆ+) Rˆ` (h |Dˆ−)
]>,
where Rˆ` (h |Dˆ) = 1|Dˆ |
∑ |Dˆ |
i=1 `(yi ,h(xi )) is the normalized empirical
risk evaluated over the training data and Dˆ+ and Dˆ− corresponds
to the mutually exclusive sets of positive and negative training data
pairs, respectively, such that Dˆ = Dˆ+ ∪ Dˆ−. We note that we use
symbol description
Dˆ actual training data
Dˆ class of training data
Dˆ+ positive training data
Dˆ− negative training data
Θ set of aacker capability parameters
α aacker capability parameter where α ∈ Θ
Dˆα tapered training data
Dˆα class of tampered training data
Dˆ+α positive tampered training data
Dˆ−α negative tampered training data
N number of training data pairs (i.e., |Dˆ | )
N pair of |Dˆ+ | and |Dˆ− |
F set of classiers
H subset of classiers (i.e.,H ⊆ F )
L set of linear classiers
S set of loss functions
` loss function in S
`c convex loss function in S
`01 0-1 loss function in S
P classication algorithm
PF ,S class of classication algorithms
PH , ` classication algorithm
PL,S class of linear classication algorithms
PL, `c convex loss linear classication algorithm
PL, `01 0-1 loss linear classication algorithm
PM, `01 majority 0-1 loss linear classication algorithm
дP resilience bound of a classication algorithm P
G set of resilience bounds
AP resilience aack condition of a classication al-
gorithm P where AP ⊆ Θ
BP perfectly aackable condition of a classication
algorithm P where BP ⊆ Θ
Table 2: e glossary of mathematical notations.
Equation (1) for distinguishing empirical risks over positive and neg-
ative training data, but it is equivalent to the standard notation [50]
ifw+ = |Dˆ+ | andw− = |Dˆ− |, and we assume the standard notion in
this paper. Also, we call hˆ a classier (i.e., hˆ ∈ YX ) or a real-valued
classier (i.e., hˆ′ ∈ RX ), interchangeably, assuming the composition
of a sign function and a real-valued classier (i.e., sign ◦hˆ′ ∈ YX )
is a classier. Moreover, we say N is the number of training data
pairs or N = ( |Dˆ+ |, |Dˆ− |), interchangeably.
In this paper, we consider a set of classication algorithms PF ,S ,
where F is a set of classiers and S is the set of monotonically non-
increasing functions that are lower-bounded by a 0-1 loss function.
Specically, the loss function `(y,h(x )) is represented as `(y,h(x ))
= ϕ (t ), where t = yh(x ), ϕ is lower-bounded by 1 {t ≤ 0}, ϕ (0) = 1,
ϕ is a monotonically non-increasing function, and limt→∞ ϕ (t ) = c
for some scalar c < 1. We note that these assumptions generalize a
convex loss [5] to cover a non-convex loss.
Each algorithm in PF ,S is a map from a class of training data
Dˆ to a subset of F that uses a loss function in S (i.e., PF ,S =
{PF , ` |F ⊆ F , ` ∈ S}). us, empirical risk minimization (Equa-
tion (1)) for any hypothesis space H ⊆ F and a loss function
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` ∈ S is also a classication algorithm considered here (i.e., PH , ` ∈
PF ,S ).
3.2 Attacker Capabilities
In this work, we introduce a new class of an aack based on the
number of training data elements the aacker can manipulate,
referenced to as a bounded feature aack (BFA). Specically, in
this class of an aack, we assume the aacker has the following
three capabilities; (i) e aacker knows the classication algo-
rithm to be aacked, (ii) the aacker has unbounded computing
power, (iii) the aacker knows all the training data (both before
and aer tampering), and (iv) the aacker can tamper the training
data. However, the ability to tamper the training data is limited
such that the tampered training data Dˆα diers from the original
training data Dˆ by a nite number of elements. We parameterize
the tampered training data using an aacker capability parameter
α = (α+,α−) ∈ Θ = [0, |Dˆ+ |] × [0, |Dˆ− |] such that at most α+ and
α− number of positive and negative feature vectors are maliciously
manipulated, respectively. Formally, the α-bounded feature aack
is dened as follows:
Denition 1 (bounded feature aack). Given PH , ` , Dˆ, and α ,
then Dˆα is a bounded feature aack (BFA) if Dˆα ∈ Dˆ satises the
following two conditions:
(i) |Dˆ+α \Dˆ+ | ≤ α+, (ii) |Dˆ−α \Dˆ− | ≤ α−. (2)
Additionally, let Dˆα be the set of all such Dˆα (i.e., Dˆα ∈ Dˆα ⊆ Dˆ).
We emphasize that Denition 1 only species what an aacker can
do and which information can be used – but does not indicate how
the aacker changes the data. is denition is consistent with the
aacker capability denition used in the CPS security literature
(e.g., [18, 38]). Moreover, α is unknown in general, so algorithms
considered in this paper do not assume anything on α .
e BFA represents a practical model of aacker capabilities. For
example, assume several devices collect medical data and store it
in the hospitals central data center. An aacker can exploit known
vulnerabilities of the enterprise system of the data center to gain
read access on all data (i.e., knows all data), but can only alter data
from specic devices having a certain vulnerabilities (i.e., aacks
some of the data). Here, we assume obtaining write access is more
dicult than obtaining read access.
In comparison to other aack models discussed in Section 2,
we emphasize that the proposed aacker capabilities are quite
general; we only limit the number of tampered feature vectors.
By denition, the BFA includes the ME; moreover, the BFA can
represent aacks on (maliciously) manipulating labels in training
data. is is achieved by manipulating a positive feature vector
into one of the negative feature vectors, which eectively switches
the label from positive to negative and suggests the BFA includes
the CICE and CDCE models.
3.3 Resilience Metric
To evaluate a classication algorithm in the presence of a BFA, we
aim to quantify the eect of a BFA on the learned classier’s worst-
case error metric over all training data and all possible aacks. In
traditional detection and classication theory, the true-positive and
true-negative rates (or the corresponding false-positive and false-
negative rates) are commonly used to evaluate the performance of
a classier. We introduce a generic metric that utilizes the false-
positive and false-negative rates such that it measures the worst-
case weighted p-norm of the two error rates over all training data
and all feasible aacks, dened as follows:
Denition 2 (resilience metric). Given N and α , the resilience of
PH , ` is quantied as the worst-case weighted p-norm of error rates
over all Dˆ ∈ Dˆ and Dˆα ∈ Dˆα , stated as
VW ,p (PH , ` |N ,α )= max
Dˆ, Dˆα
W ·Rˆ`01 (PH , ` (Dˆα ) |Dˆ)p . (3)
is resilience metric measures the performance of a classication
algorithm (i.e., VW ,p (·)) in the presence of the worst-cast aack
given the aacker capability parameter α .
In this work, we select w+ = w− = 1 and p = ∞. So, VW ,p (·)
ranges from zero to one and equals one if PH , ` outputs any clas-
sier such that an aack could result in mis-classication of all
the positive or negative feature vectors in the un-aacked training
data Dˆ. For notational simplicity, we denote VW ,p (·) as V (·). Our
selection of w+ = w− = 1 means each label is equally important to
model the unknown aacker’s preference for each label. e choice
of p = ∞ is motivated by the worst-case classication approach
that minimizes the maximum of class-conditional error rates [31].
We note that other norm measures could have been chosen rather
than the∞-norm. For instance, selecting p = 1 results in evaluating
the 1-norm of the false-positive and false-negative rates, where
V (·) ≥ 1 implies that the classier is at least as bad as a weighted
coin-ip (i.e., a trivial classier) [49]. Additionally, selecting p = 2
species V (·) to be the Euclidean distance to the classier error of
zero. In general, the selection of p in Equation (3) can vary based
upon the security concerns.
Applying the resilience metric in Equation (3), a binary classi-
cation algorithm PH , ` can be evaluated for given N and α . Further-
more, the resilience metric can be upper bounded by a function in
N and α , i.e., д(N ,α ) : (N0 × N0 × N0) → [0, 1] where G is the set
of all such д. en, the upper bound characterizes the property of
an algorithm over various aack parameters. In this case, the classi-
cation algorithm is called a д(N ,α )-resilient algorithm. Formally,
we dene the resilience property of a classication algorithm in
the context of this work as follows.
Denition 3 (д(N ,α )-resilience). A classication algorithm P is
д(N ,α )-resilient to a BFA if
V (P |N ,α ) ≤ д(N ,α ), (4)
where д ∈ G denotes the worst-case resilience bound.
is worst-case resilience bound plays a key role in dening re-
silient binary classication problem, which is dened in the follow-
ing section.
4 PROBLEM FORMULATION
is section formulates the problem of analyzing (and ultimately
designing) resilient binary classication algorithms with respect
to training data aacks. Specically, given the number of positive
and negative training data N , a set of classiers F , a set of loss
functions S, and a class of algorithms PF ,S , the goal of this paper
is nding a classication algorithm P and a resilience bound д that
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minimize the error of the resilience bound such that P is д(N ,α )-
resilient to a BFA. Here, to measure the error of the resilience bound
we use the number of α that makes the resilience bound maximum
(i.e., ∑α ∈Θ 1{д(N ,α ) = 1}), but any other error measure can be
used. In short, a resilient binary classication problem is dened
as follows:
Problem (BFA resilient binary classification problem). Gi-
venN , F , S, and PF ,S , a BFA resilient binary classication problem
is to nd a classication algorithm P ∈ PF ,S and a resilience bound
д ∈ G according to
(P ,д) = arg min
P,д
∑
α ∈Θ
1{д(N ,α ) = 1} (5)
s.t. V (P |N ,α ) ≤ д(N ,α ),∀α ∈ Θ. (6)
We note several implications of the above problem. First, a feasible
classication algorithm of this problem guarantees the worst-case
performance characterized by д since the constraint of the problem
enforces that the worst-case error (i.e., V (·)) is bounded by д for all
possible aacks (i.e., ∀α ). Next, the problem can consider the capa-
bilities of classication algorithms by encoding prior knowledge
on the class of classication algorithms PF ,S . Specically, PF ,S
can be the class of classication algorithms that uses empirical
risk minimization over F with convex loss functions. e resilient
classication problem then nds a classication algorithm in the
restricted class of PF ,S . We note that when choosing the restricted
class of classication algorithms in this paper, we do not consider
the aacker capability parameter α , implying we focus on nding
an algorithm without assumptions on α . en, the ultimate goal
of the resilient binary classication problem is making д(·) ≤ ϵ
for some N and for all α given conditions on PF ,S , where ϵ is a
suciently small scalar. Finally, we note that the resilience binary
classication problem is related to the problem of minimizing gener-
alization error of a classier considered in traditional classication
(See Section 1 in [40]).
We note that in this paper a BFA resilient binary classication
problem is simply called a resilient binary classication problem
assuming a BFA as an aack model. дP denotes the optimal д of
the resilient binary classication problem to explicitly represent
the dependency on P . Also, an algorithm A is more resilient than an
algorithm B if ∑α ∈Θ 1{дA (N ,α ) = 1} ≤ ∑α ∈Θ 1{дB (N ,α ) = 1},
and A,B, дA, and дB satisfy the constraint in the problem (Equa-
tion (6)). In the following section, we utilize the denition of the
resilient binary classication problem to analyze traditional linear
classication algorithms for resilience under a BFA.
5 RESILIENCE OF TRADITIONAL
LINEAR CLASSIFICATION
Traditional classication algorithms (e.g. SVMs or 0-1 loss linear
classication) rarely consider a learning environment that is par-
tially controlled by aackers. Here, we focus on linear classication
algorithms (i.e., F = L, where L is the set of linear functions),
which is a basic building block for more complex classication
algorithms. In this section, we analyze whether traditional linear
classication algorithms are resilient. First, linear classication
algorithms with various convex loss functions are analyzed (Sec-
tion 5.1). Next, a linear classication algorithm with a 0-1 loss
function is analyzed (Section 5.2).
In the following, we strictly consider un-aacked training data
Dˆ for which a perfect classier exists – i.e., for some h ∈ H , ‖W ·
Rˆ` (h |Dˆ)‖1 = 0 – such that only errors are introduced by aacks.
We note that, in practice, the empirical risk over training data is
rarely equal to zero due to errors from noise and an assumption on
H . However, by treating errors as aacks, the theoretical results
in the following sections can be interpreted as assuming worst-case
errors – e.g., aacks.
e resilient binary classication problem nds a classication
algorithm P and a resilience bound дP , but the resilience bound
may be trivial for some α , i.e., д(N ,α ) = 1. us, it is worthwhile
to nd a resilience aack condition, AP ⊆ Θ, such that д(N ,α ) is
non-trivial for all α ∈ AP . In this case, we say that P is resilient
w.r.t. AP .
Denition 4 (resilient w.r.t. AP ). Given N , P , дP , and AP , a
classication algorithm P is resilient w.r.t AP if the algorithm is
д(N ,α )-resilient to a BFA and д(N ,α ) < 1 for all α ∈ AP .
Here, we emphasize that nding an aack condition on α that
makes a classication algorithm 1-resilient to a BFA (i.e., nding
some set BP such that BP ⊆ AcP ) is equally important to nding
the resilience aack conditionAP since α ∈ BP can be a “breaking
point” of the algorithm P . We refer to BP as the perfectly aackable
condition of P . us, we introduce a new notion, perfectly aackable
w.r.t BP , which is formally described as follows:
Denition 5 (perfectly aackable w.r.t. BP ). Given N , P , and BP ,
a classication algorithm P is perfectly aackable w.r.t BP if the
algorithm is 1-resilient to a BFA for all α ∈ BP .
Next, we introduce amaximal resilience aack condition A¯ ⊆ Θ. It is
a resilience aack condition of some linear classication algorithm
or a combination of algorithms where the size of the condition is
maximal. Formally,
Denition 6 (maximally resilient condition). A¯ is a maximal re-
silient condition if A¯ = ∪`∈SAPL, ` .
We note that if the resilience aack conditionAP of a classication
algorithm P is same as A¯, we say that P is maximally resilient. To
nd the maximal resilience aack condition A¯, we consider some
superset of it (i.e., B¯c such that A¯ ⊆ B¯c ), which is a theoretical
upper bound of the maximal resilience aack condition. We argue
that there exists some classication algorithm that achieves the
aack condition B¯c . is then implies B¯c is the maximal resilience
aack condition (See eorem 2).
One example of B¯ can be some subset of ∩`∈SBPL, ` due to
A¯ = ∪`∈SAPL, ` ⊆ ∪`∈SBcPL, ` ⊆ B¯c . e following theorems
formally state B¯ and a condition when B¯c is the maximal resilience
aack condition.
Theorem 1. Given |Dˆ+ | and |Dˆ− |, let B¯ be{
α
α+ ≥ 12 |Dˆ+ | or α− ≥ 12 |Dˆ− |} . (7)
For all ` ∈ S, PL, ` is perfectly aackable w.r.t. B¯.
proof sketch. For all N , α ∈ B¯, and ` ∈ S, we nd some Dˆ
and Dˆα where V (PL, ` (Dˆα ) |N ,α ) = 1. See Section 2.2.1 in [40] for
details. 
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Figure 1: Perfectly attackable conditions onα for each linear
classication algorithm (colored in red). Assume |Dˆ+ | = 75,
and |Dˆ− | = 25.
Theorem 2. If there exists P ∈ PL,S such that AP = B¯c , then
B¯c is the maximal resilience aack condition.
proof sketch. We use the following two set relations to prove
A¯ = B¯c : (1) A¯ ⊆ B¯c = AP and (2) AP ⊆ A¯. See Section 2.2.2 in
[40] for details. 
e intuitive interpretation of B¯ is that if the number of tampered
positive or negative feature vectors is greater than or equal to
the half of |Dˆ+ | or |Dˆ− |, respectively, then any linear classication
algorithm trained with this training data can be perfectly aackable
w.r.t. B¯. We note that in Section 6 we show B¯ is actually the
maximal resilience aack condition. us, we assume this from
now on. In the following subsections, we show that two classical
approaches do not achieve the maximal resilience: (i) convex loss
linear classication; and (ii) 0-1 loss linear classication.
5.1 Convex Loss Linear Classication
In this section, the class of convex-loss linear classication algo-
rithms is considered, where it is the collection of PL, `c ∈ PL,S ,
where `c is any convex relaxation of a 0-1 loss function, such as a
hinge loss function. SVMs and a maximum likelihood learning of lo-
gistic regression belong to this class. We prove that any algorithm in
this class is perfectly aackable w.r.t. some aack condition where
an aacker can tamper at least one feature vector. Let BPL, `c be the
aack condition for the convex-loss linear classication algorithms
being perfectly aackable, and then the aack condition is formally
stated as follows:
Proposition 1. Let BPL, `c be the set of α that satises one of the
following two conditions:
(i) α+ > 0, (ii) α− > 0. (8)
en, PL, `c is perfectly aackable w.r.t BPL, `c and resilient w.r.t.BcPL, `c .
proof sketch. e idea of “perfectly aackable” proof is that
for allN andα ∈ BPL, `c we nd some Dˆ and Dˆα whereV (PL, `c (Dˆα )|N ,α ) = 1. e “resilient” proof is trivial. See Section 2.2.3 in [40]
for details. 
is implies even though an aacker has weak ability to tamper
training data, it can make the algorithm misclassify all positive or all
negative feature vectors of un-aacked training data by tampering
only one positive or negative feature vector (See Figure 1a for
the visualization of the perfectly aackable condition on α ). For
example, data-driven CPS that use SVMs to train intrusion detectors
[39] can be vulnerable if an aacker can tamper at least one feature
vector. We note that convex-loss linear classication algorithms
are not maximally resilient since BcPL, `c ⊂ B¯
c .
5.2 0-1 Loss Linear Classication
A 0-1 loss linear classication algorithm is dened as PL, `01 ∈PL,S , where `01 (·) is a 0-1 loss function. We prove that the 0-1 loss
linear classication algorithm is perfectly aackable w.r.t. some at-
tack condition where the number of tampered positive or negative
feature vectors is greater than or equal to the half of |Dˆ+ | or |Dˆ− |,
respectively, or the sum of the number of tampered positive feature
vectors and the number of tampered negative feature vectors is
greater than or equal to |Dˆ− | or |Dˆ+ |. Let BPL, `01 be the aack
condition for the 0-1 loss linear classication algorithm being per-
fectly aackable, and then the aack condition is formally stated
as follows:
Proposition 2. Given |Dˆ+ | and |Dˆ− |, let BPL, `01 be the set of α
that satises one of the following four conditions:
(i) α+ ≥ 12 |Dˆ
+ |, (ii) α− ≥ 12 |Dˆ
− |,
(iii) α+ + α− ≥ |Dˆ− |, (iv) α+ + α− ≥ |Dˆ+ |. (9)
en, PL, `01 is perfectly aackable w.r.t. BPL, `01 .
proof sketch. For all N and α ∈ BPL, `01 we nd some Dˆ and
Dˆα where V (PL, `01 (Dˆα ) |N ,α ) = 1. See Section 2.2.4 in [40] for
details. 
is proposition implies the 0-1 loss linear classication is strictly
more resilient than convex one (See Figure 1b for comparison).
us, dierent to the convex case, tampering single feature vector
is not critical for the 0-1 loss linear classication. is means
any CPS using convex linear classication algorithms [12, 39, 42]
can be converted into the 0-1 linear classication algorithm to
defend against the single feature vector tampering; however, neither
approach can provide maximal resilience due to BcPL, `01 ⊂ B¯
c .
6 RESILIENT LINEAR CLASSIFICATION
In this section, we propose a maximally resilient linear classica-
tion algorithm. A majority 0-1 loss linear classication is dened
as PM, `01 ∈ PL,S , whereM denotes a majority constraint that
restricts a feasible set of classiers by only allowing a classier
that correctly classies at least half of positive and negative feature
vectors, according to
M=
{
h ∈LRˆ`01 (h |Dˆ+α )< 12 and Rˆ`01 (h |Dˆ−α )< 12 }. (10)
In the following subsections, the resilience proof and the worst-case
resilience bound of the majority 0-1 classication are provided.
6.1 Resilience of Majority 0-1 Loss Linear
Classication
e majority 0-1 loss linear classication is perfectly aackable w.r.t.
some aack condition where an aacker can manipulate greater
than or equal to the half of |Dˆ+ | or |Dˆ− |. Let BPM, `01 be the aack
condition for the majority 0-1-loss linear classication algorithms
being perfectly aackable, and then the aack condition is formally
stated as follows:
Theorem 3. Given |Dˆ+ | and |Dˆ− |, let BPM, `01 be{
α
α+ ≥ 12 |Dˆ+ | or α− ≥ 12 |Dˆ− |} . (11)
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en, PM, `01 is perfectly aackable w.r.t. BPM, `01 and resilient w.r.t.BcPM, `01 .
proof sketch. e ideal of “perfectly aackable” proof is that
for all N and α ∈ BPM, `01 we nd some Dˆ and Dˆα whereV (PM, `01
(Dˆα ) |N ,α ) = 1. For the “resilient” proof, we exploit the property
of the majority constraint. See Section 2.2.5 in [40] for details. 
is result shows that the majority 0-1 loss linear classication
algorithm is more resilient than traditional linear classication
algorithms, which is also illustrated in Figure 1c. Furthermore,
it achieves the maximal resilience condition (eorem 1) due to
BPM, `01 = B¯, showing this algorithm achieves the maximal re-
silience aack condition.
6.2 Robustness of Resilient Classication
If a classication algorithm is resilient, it is worth analyzing the
degree of resilience. If α ∈ APM, `01 , where APM, `01 = BcPM, `01 ,
then the worst-case resilience bound д of the majority 0-1 loss
classication algorithm is nearly proportional to the tampering
ability of an aacker, which is formally stated as follows:
Theorem 4. Given |Dˆ+ |, |Dˆ− |, and α ∈ APM, `01 , the resilience
bound д of PM, `01 can be computed as follows:
д(N ,α )=max*,
min
(
2α+ + α−,α+ + |Dˆ
+ |−1
2
)
|Dˆ+ | ,
min
(
α+ + 2α−,α− + |Dˆ
− |−1
2
)
|Dˆ− |
+-. (12)
proof sketch. To prove V (·) is bounded by д(·) for all N and
α ∈ APM, `01 , we exploit the optimality condition of an optimal
classier PM, `01 (Dˆα ) and the property of the majority constraint.
To prove that the bound is tight for all N and α ∈ APM, `01 , we
nd some Dˆ and Dˆα whereV (·) = д(·). See Section 2.2.6 in [40] for
details. 
is theorem shows that if α ∈ APM, `01 , the resilience bound is non-
trivial. Also, it shows that even if the aacker capability parameter
α is restricted (i.e., α ∈ APM, `01 ) to ensure that the algorithm is
resilient w.r.t. APM, `01 , the tampered portion of training data still
aects on the accuracy of the algorithm. Finally, we note that the
resilience bound д is tight.
7 CASE STUDY
In this section, we validate the proven resilience of algorithms
experimentally. alitative results on synthetic data are presented
in Figure 3 and results on a real-world retrospective arrhythmia
data are shown in Table 3.
e majority 0-1 loss linear classication algorithm is formulated
in the following mixed integer linear program (MILP).
min
h,e,z
1>z + λ‖h‖2
s.t. ∀i, ei ≥ 1 − yih>xi , −δz ≤ e ≤ δz
1>+z ≤
1
2 ( |Dˆ
+
α | − 1), 1>−z ≤
1
2 ( |Dˆ
−
α | − 1),
Heart Pacemaker Arrhythmia detector 
Alarm 
Figure 2: Pacemaker with an Arrhythmia detector.
where (xi ,yi ) is an ith training data pair, h ∈ Rp is a real-valued
classier, e ∈ R |Dˆα | denotes a scaled classication error, z ∈
{0, 1} |Dˆα | is a vector that indicates misclassication of each train-
ing data pair, λ is a regularization constant, set to zero, and δ is
a suciently large positive constant, where δ = 103. 1+ and 1−
represent vectors where a jth element is lled with one if yj = +1
and yj = −1, respectively, and zeros elsewhere. We note that the
0-1 loss linear classication algorithm is formulated in the same
way to the above MILP except for the last two constraints (See
Section 3 in [40]), related to the majority constraint, and we adopt
a standard SVMs formulation [15] without a regularization term
for fair comparison. eoretically, the performance of the 0-1 loss
linear classication algorithm is as good as that of the convex loss
linear classication algorithms [5]. If there are no aack and no
error, the 0-1 loss linear classication algorithm is same as the
majority 0-1 loss linear classication algorithm since the last two
constraints of MILP are not activated if there are no aacks and no
error.
In experiments, we consider two types of aacks: a point aack
and an overlap aack, which are concrete instances of a BFA. e
point aack is an aack that manipulates a single feature vector to
be located far from the training data as illustrated in Figure 3. e
aacked single feature vector is chosen and tampered as follows.
Let α+ = 1, and x¯+ and x¯− be the mean of positive and negative
feature vectors, respectively. Any positive feature vector is chosen
and replaced to a scaled vector σx where the scaled vector is on the
half-line from x¯+ to the direction of x¯− − x¯+, and the scale value σ
is a suciently large scalar.
e overlap aack is an aack that manipulates positive and/or
negative feature vectors to be overlapped negative and/or positive
feature vectors, respectively, as illustrated in Figure 3. e over-
lap aack is briey described as follows: when α = (α+,α−), α+
and α− number of positive and negative feature vectors are ran-
domly chosen for tampering, respectively. e chosen positive and
negative feature vectors are randomly overlapped to negative and
positive un-aacked feature vectors, respectively. ese steps are
repeated until a target classication algorithm achieves a maximum
desired resilience value V (·).
Synthetic data. In Figure 3, the classication results of each
linear classication algorithm, such as SVMs, the 0-1 loss linear
classication, and the majority 0-1 loss linear classication, are
illustrated with dierent types of an aack. e original train-
ing data without aacks is randomly drawn from two Gaussian
distributions, as illustrated in the rst column and the rst row,
where |Dˆ+ | = 20 and |Dˆ− | = 80. When there is no aack (the rst
row in Figure 3), all three algorithms correctly classify training
data. If there is a point aack (the second row in Figure 3), only
SVMs algorithm is aected by the aack, outpuing a classier
ICCPS, April 2017, Pisburgh, PA USA Sangdon Park, James Weimer, and Insup Lee
ApproachAack Type Training Data SVMs 0-1 0-1 with majority
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Figure 3: e resilience of each linear classication algorithm under the specied attacks. e blue or red mark represents a
positive or negative feature vector, respectively. e feature vector in the blue or red region is classied as positive or negative,
respectively.
Approach
Aack Type SVMs 0-1 0-1 withmajority
No Aack
(α+, α− ) = (0, 0) 0.0 0.0 0.0
Point Aack
(α+, α− ) = (0, 1)
1.0 0.0270 0.0270
Overlap Aack
(α+, α− ) = (16, 21)
1.0 1.0 0.5946
Table 3: e resilience metric V (·) of each linear classi-
cation algorithm for Arrhythmia detection [24] under the
specied attacks.
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Figure 4: e degree of the resilience of PM, `01 in the re-
silience metricV (·) with respect to the ability of an attacker.
e blue solid and dashed line represents the theoretical
robustness bound (Equation (12)) and the red cross means
the empirically evaluated feasible resilience. Assume |Dˆ+ | =
|Dˆ− | and α+ = α−.
that misclassies all positive feature vectors of un-aacked training
data. When an overlap aack (the third row in Figure 3) is applied,
where α− = 24, both SVMs and the 0-1 loss linear classication
output classiers that misclassies all positive feature vectors of
un-aacked training data while the majority 0-1 loss classication
algorithm still correctly classies the portion of the positive feature
vectors of un-aacked training data, showing that the majority
0-1 loss classication algorithm is more resilient than others.
Moreover, using the synthetic data, the theoretical worst-case
resilience bound (Equation (12)) of the majority 0-1 loss linear
classication is experimentally shown in Figure 4. e blue line
represents the theoretical worst-case resilience bound. Red points
are the resilience V (·) over the corresponding α . Specically, 100
dierent Dˆ are randomly generated, where Dˆ+ and Dˆ− are drawn
from two Gaussian distributions of positive and negative labels,
respectively. For each Dˆ and for each α+, which ranges from 0 to
the total number of positive feature vectors, an aacker moves α+
number of positive feature vectors beyond the negative features in
100 dierent ways to obtain Dˆα so that positive and negative feature
vectors cannot be linearly separable. By taking the maximum of
V (·) for 100 dierent Dˆ and 100 dierent Dˆα , the resilience V (·)
is obtained for each α+, which is represented in a red cross. In
Figure 4, the red crosses do not excess the theoretical bound and
the increasing trend follows the bound.
Medical data. We evaluated the resilience of traditional linear
classication algorithms and the proposed algorithm using arrhyth-
mia dataset. e arrhythmia, a.k.a irregular heartbeat, is a condition
of the heart in which the heartbeat is irregular. An arrhythmia de-
tector cooperated with logs from pacemaker can reduce stroke and
death rate [21]. To design such a detector, electrocardiogram (ECG)
training data can be collected from logs of the pacemaker (Figure 2)
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whether ECG data is normal or abnormal (e.g., atrial brillation or
sinus tachycardia). But, if the pacemaker is vulnerable, the train-
ing data can be tampered to hinder to detect arrhythmia, possibly
leading to death.
In Table 3, we have compared the resilience V (·) of each algo-
rithm on real medical dataset. Arrhythmia dataset [24], which can
be found at the UCI machine learning repository [32], is used for
evaluating the resilience of each algorithm. e Arrhythmia dataset
is preprocessed as follows. Due to the computational limitation to
solve the MILP, we use 20 percent of training data (i.e., |Dˆ+ | = 37
and |Dˆ− | = 49) and select features from 40th and 99th for train-
ing classiers. We’ve obtained the same results as illustrated with
synthetic data. SVMs algorithm outputs a classier that misclas-
sies all positive or negative feature vectors under both a point
aack and an overlap aack. 0-1 loss linear classication does not
aect on a point aack but outputs a classier that misclassies
all positive or negative feature vectors when an overlap aack is
applied by tampering 43.2 and 42.8 percent of positive and negative
feature vector, respectively. However, the majority 0-1 loss linear
classication still correctly classies the portion of positive and
negative feature vectors even though about 43 percent of training
data were tampered. We emphasize that V (·) values in Table 3 are
not prediction results, but they are evaluated over training data,
making V (·) = 0 possible. However, a higher V (·) value implies
higher prediction error.
Comparison with [28]. Kearns and Li’s paper [28] analyzes a
binary classication problem under the malicious error (ME) model,
but our paper analyzes a binary linear classication problem un-
der a BFA, which is a general case of the ME model. Here, we
compare each paper’s result by providing an example. Assume a
binary linear classication problem under the ME model, where
|Dˆ+ | = |Dˆ− | = 50 and α+ = α− = 10. Kearns and Li’s paper states
that if a designer wants to have the expected accuracy of 0.9, then
α+
|Dˆ+ | =
α−
|Dˆ− | <
0.1
1+0.1 ≈ 0.091 regardless of a classication algo-
rithm. is means at most 0.091 percent of training data can be
tampered to guarantee the expected accuracy. However, this does
not state anything on the expected accuracy when α+|Dˆ+ | ≥ 0.091. In
comparison to this, our paper implies that, in the case of the major-
ity 0-1 linear classication algorithm, д( |Dˆ |, (α+,α−)) = 0.6. is
means that a designer can expect the accuracy on training data that
is at least 1− 0.6 = 0.4. is further implies the expected minimum
accuracy can be approximately 0.4 when α+|Dˆ+ | = 0.2 ≥ 0.091. We
note that the connection between the accuracy on training data
(i.e., the performance measure of this paper) and the expected accu-
racy (i.e., the performance measure of traditional classication) can
be found in Section 1 in [40].
8 CONCLUSIONS
In particularly, the incorrect decisions on CPS directly aect on a
physical environment, so learning techniques under training data
aacks should be scrutinized. Toward the goal of resilient machine
learning, we propose a resilience metric for the analysis and design
of a resilient classication algorithm under training data aacks.
Traditional algorithms, such as convex loss linear classication al-
gorithms and the 0-1 loss linear classication algorithm, are proved
to be resilient under restricted conditions. However, the proposed
0-1 loss linear classication with a majority constraint is more
resilient than others, and it is the maximally resilient algorithm
among linear classication algorithms. e worst-case resilience
bound of the proposed algorithm is then provided, suggesting how
resilient the algorithm is under training data aacks.
Countermeasures. e resilience analysis on dierent linear
classication algorithms provides us clues for countermeasures on
training data aacks. Here, we briey discuss a possible direction
for countermeasures and its challenges. In general, additional al-
gorithms can be considered to eliminate the worst-case situations
in the analysis of each classication algorithm. For example, to
defend against the point aack on SVMs, it might be considered
to add a preprocessing step that saturates large values in training
data. Specically, if a designer knows the minimum and maximum
range of features, then range can saturate the large values that con-
tribute to the point aack. However, this might not be an eective
countermeasure since the range of features is not known in general
and the point aack can be conducted aer the preprocessing step,
not before it.
Here, we emphasize that our analysis, which is purposely fo-
cused on a classication algorithm exclusively, helps to devise
countermeasures: combining a classication algorithm with a pre-
processing step or using a complex classication algorithm (e.g., hi-
erarchical approach and neural networks). We believe that the
advanced algorithms work beer under the training data aack in
general and our analysis on the simple algorithms (e.g., SVMs) can
be a building block for analyzing and devising advanced algorithms.
Future works. As a future work, the following issues are worth
being considered. A more practical mixed integer linear program
can speed up computational time (e.g., [37]) and it would be promis-
ing to design and analyze multiple algorithms in tandem (one to
monitor the data, one to learn a classier). It is also worth incor-
porating bounded noise error and designing error onH in analy-
sis, and extending to non-linear and multiclass classication prob-
lem. Finally, to devise countermeasures, it would be promising to
consider resilient algorithms that estimate aacker capabilities or
model prior knowledge on aackers.
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